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 ﾠ	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠMundell-ﾭFleming	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠand	 ﾠEMU	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠa	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠbook	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠarticles,	 ﾠObstfeld	 ﾠand	 ﾠTaylor	 ﾠ(2004)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
shown	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠcontours	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
century	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwell	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠby	 ﾠappealing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfamous	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
trilemma	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠemerges	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠMundell-ﾭ‐Fleming	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠmany	 ﾠof	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
still	 ﾠteach	 ﾠour	 ﾠundergraduates.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠchosen	 ﾠmacroeconomic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠregime	 ﾠcan	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ“inconsistent	 ﾠtrinity”	 ﾠof	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠgoals:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
(i)	 ﾠfull	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐border	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmovements;	 ﾠ
(ii)	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
(iii)	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠobjectives.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠproof	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠstraightforward:	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmobility	 ﾠvis-ﾭ‐à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠuncovered	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠparity;	 ﾠuncovered	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠparity	 ﾠ
combined	 ﾠwith	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
pinned	 ﾠdown	 ﾠby	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠabroad.	 ﾠA	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwith	 ﾠopen	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠmaintains	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthus	 ﾠloses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠto	 ﾠvary	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠobjectives.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Confronted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠtrilemma,	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmade	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠat	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠin	 ﾠhistory.	 ﾠMajor	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrigger	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠregime	 ﾠshifts.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclassical	 ﾠ(pre-ﾭ‐1914)	 ﾠ
gold	 ﾠstandard,	 ﾠopen	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠand	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
banks	 ﾠsubordinated	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠgold	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠstaying	 ﾠon	 ﾠgold.	 ﾠFaced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdrain,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwould	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠraise	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠinducing	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠto	 ﾠstay,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠdeflation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
restore	 ﾠits	 ﾠcompetitiveness	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠrun.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
sat	 ﾠwell	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwas	 ﾠgradually	 ﾠundermined	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠrigidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠlabour	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unemployment	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeflation	 ﾠrose,	 ﾠand	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextension	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfranchise	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠrose	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ(Eichengreen	 ﾠ1992).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ During	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterwar	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgold	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠtransmitted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
contractionary	 ﾠimpulses	 ﾠemanating	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠworldwide,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmade	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠcombat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincipient	 ﾠDepression.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠother,	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠswitched	 ﾠto	 ﾠprioritizing	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠabandoning	 ﾠ
exchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠpegs,	 ﾠopen	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠor	 ﾠboth.	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterwar	 ﾠdisaster,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠregime	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinstituted	 ﾠat	 ﾠBretton	 ﾠWoods,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠprioritised	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠautonomy	 ﾠand	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates	 ﾠ(since	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠ
devaluations	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfelt	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠcontrols,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpersisted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwere	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠ
undermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ1973	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates	 ﾠwere	 ﾠabandoned,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠworld	 ﾠentered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠera	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmobility	 ﾠand	 ﾠfloating	 ﾠrates	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠpersists	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠday.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmobility	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproved	 ﾠtroublesome	 ﾠon	 ﾠmany	 ﾠoccasions	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpersuaded	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfloating	 ﾠrate	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠwas	 ﾠone	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008-ﾭ‐9	 ﾠwas	 ﾠso	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1929-ﾭ‐
32	 ﾠ(Eichengreen	 ﾠand	 ﾠO’Rourke	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠAlmunia	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Within	 ﾠEurope,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmove	 ﾠto	 ﾠfloating	 ﾠwas	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsharp	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠmight	 ﾠpose	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Common	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠlater	 ﾠSingle)	 ﾠMarket,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgreen	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠAttempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠfluctuations	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
soon	 ﾠgot	 ﾠunderway,	 ﾠculminating	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEMS	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1979.	 ﾠInitially	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠfunctioned	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠresidual	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠcontrols,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrequent	 ﾠ
exchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠrealignments.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ1987	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠfar	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
rigid,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠwere	 ﾠabolished	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSingle	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠ
programme.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠretrospect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1992-ﾭ‐93	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠinevitable,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠnational	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠwere	 ﾠprepared	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
subordinate	 ﾠnational	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠ
rate	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprior	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubset	 ﾠof	 ﾠEC	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠto	 ﾠmove	 ﾠto	 ﾠEMU	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchallenges	 ﾠposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrilemma,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmobility.	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠdoubts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠviability	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠrun	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabandonment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
separate	 ﾠcurrencies	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠstable	 ﾠsolution.	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠsolved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠradical	 ﾠway:	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmobility	 ﾠ
combined	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠabandonment	 ﾠof	 ﾠnational	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠsovereignty.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠand	 ﾠEMU	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠis	 ﾠanother	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠtell	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠstory,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrelies	 ﾠon	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ
trilemma,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠby	 ﾠDani	 ﾠRodrik	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
series	 ﾠof	 ﾠarticles	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmost	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠbook	 ﾠ(Rodrik	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
“fundamental	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠeconomy”	 ﾠargues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“we	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
simultaneously	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠdemocracy,	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdetermination,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
globalization.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠpush	 ﾠglobalization	 ﾠfurther,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
nation	 ﾠstate	 ﾠor	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeepen	 ﾠ
democracy,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠchose	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠintegration.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstate	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
determination,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠchose	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdeepening	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeepening	 ﾠ
globalization”	 ﾠ(Rodrik	 ﾠ2011,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠxviii-ﾭ‐xix).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“deep	 ﾠ
globalization”	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠopen	 ﾠcommodity	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠ
markets,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠimply,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
mobile	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnational	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
adopt	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠor	 ﾠother	 ﾠinterventionist	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
populations	 ﾠwant	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsolutions	 ﾠare	 ﾠeither	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
manifest	 ﾠitself	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠsupra-ﾭ‐national	 ﾠmechanisms,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠignore	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ On	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreading	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐1914	 ﾠgold	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsustained,	 ﾠ
despite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeflationary	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠon	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠfranchise	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwas	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstates	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
globalization,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstraint.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
extension	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfranchise,	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgold	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠseen	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠdays	 ﾠas	 ﾠsynonymous	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
became	 ﾠunsustainable:	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠwon	 ﾠout	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
globalization.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpushed	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠdirection,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠabandonment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgold	 ﾠstandard,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ1944,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompromise	 ﾠwas	 ﾠreached,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
committing	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠto	 ﾠopen	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ(subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠexceptions)	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
retaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠautonomy.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠreserved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠintervene	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠ
economies	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠways,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠactive	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠand	 ﾠindustrial	 ﾠ
policies.	 ﾠ(What	 ﾠone	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠhere.)	 ﾠWith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
deepening	 ﾠof	 ﾠglobalization	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ‘Bretton	 ﾠWoods	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
compromise’	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠunder	 ﾠattack,	 ﾠas	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstates	 ﾠstart	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠscope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmanoeuvring	 ﾠrestricted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
anti-ﾭ‐globalization	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠfocussed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠon	 ﾠjobs	 ﾠand	 ﾠwages,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
traditionally	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠas	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠ
legislation	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell;	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠa	 ﾠmove	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠmore	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠgovernance.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtechnocratic	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Viewed	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlens	 ﾠof	 ﾠRodrik’s	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrilemma,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollapse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
EMS	 ﾠshowed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwas	 ﾠincompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
decision-ﾭ‐making,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠrun	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠ
price	 ﾠthat	 ﾠelected	 ﾠpoliticians	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
peg	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDeutschemark.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarkets’	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠsealed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfate	 ﾠof	 ﾠNorman	 ﾠLamont’s	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠstave	 ﾠoff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinevitable.	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠradical	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
trilemma	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠabandons	 ﾠnational	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
delegates	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠtechnocratic	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠ
practice	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠKingdom	 ﾠand	 ﾠelsewhere).	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomplementary	 ﾠareas,	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠregulation;	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠa	 ﾠmove	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠ
fiscal	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmost	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠalso	 ﾠregard	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdesirable	 ﾠcomplement	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠsee	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpiecemeal	 ﾠand	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠwas	 ﾠadopted,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠand	 ﾠagain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠlens	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠto	 ﾠview	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠrescue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠnotable	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpooled	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐
making,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpooled	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontrolled	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
democratically	 ﾠelected	 ﾠpoliticians.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠroots	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtraced	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbeginnings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproject	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1940s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1950s.	 ﾠ‘Europe’	 ﾠwas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdays	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠactivist	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnation	 ﾠ
states	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthings	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown:	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠwas,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwords	 ﾠof	 ﾠAlan	 ﾠMilward,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“European	 ﾠrescue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstate.”	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ As	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠin	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠeconomies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsaw	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdefeat	 ﾠof	 ﾠChurchill	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1945,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelection	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
Labour	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠsymbolised	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠof	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠEuropeans,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhad	 ﾠ
suffered	 ﾠso	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlives	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠwake.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠDepression,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
leave	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket:	 ﾠ"embedded	 ﾠliberalism"	 ﾠ(Ruggie	 ﾠ1982)	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠ
consequence.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ As	 ﾠMilward	 ﾠhas	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠheightened	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
ordinary	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠcoincided	 ﾠin	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfeeling	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠ
nation	 ﾠstates	 ﾠhad	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhad	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠin	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterwar	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhad	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠin	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠ
security	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ1939.1	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠurgent	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠrestore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstates	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠgoverned,	 ﾠby	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠ
citizens	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcraved.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠMilward,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
crucial	 ﾠconstituencies	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠplacated	 ﾠwere	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠvoters,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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disillusionment	 ﾠhad	 ﾠled	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠextremist	 ﾠparties	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterwar	 ﾠ
period	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠworkers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrising	 ﾠwages	 ﾠand	 ﾠfull	 ﾠemployment,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ensure	 ﾠrising	 ﾠliving	 ﾠstandards	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠstates.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Accomplishing	 ﾠall	 ﾠthree	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠan	 ﾠextension	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
intervention	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomy.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠstate	 ﾠreduced	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠinsecurity,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠKeynesian	 ﾠmacroeconomic	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠhelped	 ﾠstabilise	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠfluctuations.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠregards	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII	 ﾠall	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠexperienced	 ﾠ
severe	 ﾠfood	 ﾠshortages,	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠwished	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠfood	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
sufficiency	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠwas	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠ
intervention	 ﾠacross	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠall	 ﾠthese	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠas	 ﾠMilward	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠ"in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠ
run	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠnational	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Europe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
citizens	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠits	 ﾠambitions	 ﾠ
expanded	 ﾠso	 ﾠrapidly.	 ﾠIts	 ﾠlaws,	 ﾠofficials,	 ﾠpolicemen,	 ﾠspies,	 ﾠstatisticians,	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠ
collectors,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpenetrated	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar	 ﾠwider	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠable	 ﾠor	 ﾠencouraged	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo".2	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Another	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
dismantling	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠNorth	 ﾠAmerica.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠessential	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠattain	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠother	 ﾠobjectives.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcould	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
reconciled	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠabove?	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
fact,	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠreconcile	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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domestic	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠobjectives,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠachievement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠundermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
historical	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠ
took	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunusually	 ﾠsupranational	 ﾠform	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠactually	 ﾠdid,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠlooser	 ﾠ
intergovernmental	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠNAFTA,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠFree	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠArea)	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsufficed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠliberalisation	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠown.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpredict.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠreplicate	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠof	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠby	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠAgricultural	 ﾠ
Policy.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠderegulation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
politically	 ﾠimpossible,	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠagriculture,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
British	 ﾠfavoured,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠunthinkable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠ
exporters	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNetherlands.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠintergovernmental	 ﾠcooperation	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠmere	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠ
decision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠrules	 ﾠto	 ﾠset	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠprices	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠfarmers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠcan	 ﾠwell	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprices	 ﾠfavoured	 ﾠby	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠalso	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠ
production.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Governments	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1950s	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfeared	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
placed	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠvis-ﾭ‐à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠwere	 ﾠless	 ﾠwell	 ﾠdeveloped.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
were	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcar	 ﾠmanufacturers	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠindustries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠholidays	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
elsewhere;	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠprinciple)	 ﾠequal	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmen	 ﾠand	 ﾠwomen,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwomen's	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠwere	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠa	 ﾠthird	 ﾠlower	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmen's;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 9	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠset	 ﾠa	 ﾠworking	 ﾠweek	 ﾠin	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠof	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ40	 ﾠhours,	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ48	 ﾠhours	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Germany	 ﾠand	 ﾠBelgium	 ﾠ(implying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠovertime	 ﾠrates	 ﾠaccounted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠof	 ﾠweekly	 ﾠpay	 ﾠin	 ﾠFrance).	 ﾠA	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠfor	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠwere	 ﾠlower	 ﾠin	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠwages	 ﾠwere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlower.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ It	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠessential	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠonly	 ﾠunderpinned	 ﾠgovernments’	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlegitimacy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
growth	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠundermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope-ﾭ‐
wide	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠMilward	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ"The	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠwas	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
construct	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠframework	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠendanger	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠreached…The	 ﾠTreaties	 ﾠof	 ﾠRome	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
external	 ﾠbuttress	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠstate."3	 ﾠA	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
French	 ﾠdid,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
develop	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeeper	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠframework	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthen	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠunder	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠfree	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠ
common	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpooling	 ﾠof	 ﾠsovereignty	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠareas.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠof	 ﾠRome	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠyet	 ﾠrealised)	 ﾠharmonisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠCommon	 ﾠAgricultural	 ﾠPolicy.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeepen	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
integration	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmembers,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠcollectively	 ﾠretain	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdeem	 ﾠnecessary.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
opted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠintegration,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtended	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ(i.e.	 ﾠdemocratic)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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considerations	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠpolicy-ﾭ‐making.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
today	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠproblems,	 ﾠone	 ﾠold,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠnewer.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠolder	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
regulations	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdecided,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠ
nation	 ﾠstates	 ﾠunwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjump	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠfederalism.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ
days	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEEC,	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐
governmental,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠquite	 ﾠopaque.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfuelled	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠabout	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠdeficits,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠonly	 ﾠpartially	 ﾠdispelled	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠelected	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperception	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠministers	 ﾠgo	 ﾠto	 ﾠBrussels	 ﾠand	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠhorse-ﾭ‐trading	 ﾠbehind	 ﾠclosed	 ﾠdoors,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthen	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠpresenting	 ﾠParliaments	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠfait	 ﾠaccompli.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
fairness,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠmade	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠhere:	 ﾠmany	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠmeetings	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠnow	 ﾠopen,	 ﾠnational	 ﾠParliaments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠsay	 ﾠon	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠmatters,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠthan	 ﾠbefore.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
recent	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠprompted	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐governmental	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ
occurring	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠCommunity	 ﾠframework,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
remain	 ﾠunclear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Attempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠstrengthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreality	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnational	 ﾠparliaments	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠ
greater	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeyes	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠParliament	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠStrasbourg	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠto	 ﾠmention	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠin	 ﾠBrussels).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
integration	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐making,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠresistant	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbecome.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠnewer	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠ‘Europe’	 ﾠseems	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
past	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠor	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠless	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ‘rescuing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
state’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠon	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠchoices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠSingle	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠprogramme	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠEU	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠhave	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠgood	 ﾠthing	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠstandpoint,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠthreatens	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠlegitimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠunless	 ﾠthese	 ﾠnew	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠof	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
citizens.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠso	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠclear:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
preferences	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsizable	 ﾠminority,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠleast.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠheard	 ﾠ
complaint	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2005	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠreferendum	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty’s	 ﾠ
predecessor	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠtreaty	 ﾠ‘constitutionalised’	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐
market	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠought	 ﾠproperly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
left	 ﾠand	 ﾠright.	 ﾠA	 ﾠconvincing	 ﾠretort	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
reflected	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐existing	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠand	 ﾠhad	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
proposed	 ﾠ‘Constitutional	 ﾠTreaty’:	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠcomplaint	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
‘Europe’	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnow	 ﾠexcluding	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠremained.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrilemma,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠuneasy	 ﾠhalfway	 ﾠhouse.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠembrace	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠhas	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠshift	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupranational	 ﾠ
politics,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠremains	 ﾠa	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠprogress.	 ﾠPolicy-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠis	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠ
intergovernmental,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenuinely	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠremains	 ﾠelusive	 ﾠ–	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠremarkable	 ﾠexceptions	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
electoral	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠDaniel	 ﾠCohn-ﾭ‐Bendit	 ﾠon	 ﾠboth	 ﾠsides	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠRhine.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpart,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
led	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtechnocratic	 ﾠstyle	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitics,	 ﾠdiluting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠelement	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmaking.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcritics,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠspectrum.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠ
bold	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmight	 ﾠrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠopinion,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
act	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown.	 ﾠ(Sadly,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠIreland’s	 ﾠunilateral	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ
guarantees	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠ‘Europe’	 ﾠis	 ﾠnow	 ﾠrestraining	 ﾠIreland’s	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbelatedly	 ﾠand	 ﾠpartially	 ﾠrectifying	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsuicidal	 ﾠmistake.)	 ﾠJust	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
importantly,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠareas	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠ
others	 ﾠremain	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠunclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
makes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoherent	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠset-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠEMU.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Schematically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconceptualised	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlines	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠTaking	 ﾠas	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcommitment	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠareas),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠsays	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠis	 ﾠthen	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠshared	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠWhere	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠare	 ﾠnationally	 ﾠdetermined,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠof	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠ
responsive	 ﾠto	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠopinion.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠtake	 ﾠan	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠis	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
overwhelmingly	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠregulate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
sector,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnational	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeet	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcompanies.	 ﾠAlternatively,	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjointly	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
determined.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthen	 ﾠa	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdelegating	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐political	 ﾠ
entity,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠdemocratically	 ﾠelected	 ﾠrepresentatives.	 ﾠ
Delegating	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠto	 ﾠtechnocrats	 ﾠmay	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠlot	 ﾠof	 ﾠsense	 ﾠeconomically,	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠrules	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscretion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠin	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
jurisdictions	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠto	 ﾠreplace	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
discretion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbinding	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠin	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
politics	 ﾠto	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
determined	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠongoing	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠby	 ﾠelected	 ﾠpoliticians,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠusing	 ﾠ
intergovernmental	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠruns	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠoutlined	 ﾠabove)	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠfully-ﾭ‐fledged	 ﾠ‘federal’	 ﾠprocedures.	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠis	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠstuck	 ﾠsomewhere	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLisbon	 ﾠTreaty	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠshifted	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠmodestly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ‘federal’	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠand	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdemonstrated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠto	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠand	 ﾠresolution.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠreform	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
EMU	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠif	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcrises	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠavoided,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
centralised	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠsmooth	 ﾠasymmetric	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠwould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
helpful.	 ﾠWill	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠforward	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
lines,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwill	 ﾠit	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠreliance	 ﾠon	 ﾠnational	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaybe	 ﾠeven	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
unravelling	 ﾠof	 ﾠEMU?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Public	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠwill	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠdigressing	 ﾠ
briefly	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠand	 ﾠEMU	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
particular.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuro	 ﾠproject	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠless	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSingle	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠproject	 ﾠenjoyed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1992	 ﾠ(Figure	 ﾠ2).	 ﾠEven	 ﾠworse,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
started	 ﾠout	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠnet	 ﾠratings	 ﾠin	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠits	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠmember,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠis	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
maintain	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠstability.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠany	 ﾠreal	 ﾠprogress	 ﾠ











Figure	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠAttitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSingle	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuro	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1992	 ﾠ&	 ﾠ1997	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(Eurobarometer	 ﾠsurveys)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Second,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠclass	 ﾠcleavage	 ﾠas	 ﾠregards	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠand	 ﾠIrish	 ﾠreferenda	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
2005	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2008:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠeducated,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠskilled	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
affluent	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠvote	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠtreaties	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠthe	 ﾠless	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐educated,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠless	 ﾠskilled	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠ(Brouard	 ﾠand	 ﾠTiberj	 ﾠ
2006,	 ﾠSinnott	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠOne	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐serving	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
findings	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠless	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐educated	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐EU	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
sufficiently	 ﾠwell	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠproject.	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠ
interpretation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠincompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
class	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠreal	 ﾠor	 ﾠperceived.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
unskilled	 ﾠin	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠless	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠeverywhere,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠless	 ﾠto	 ﾠgain	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠskilled	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmobile	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠPolish	 ﾠplumbers,	 ﾠdélocalisation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠreading,	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠintegration	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠbroader	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠglobalization	 ﾠin	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(Mayda	 ﾠ2006,	 ﾠMayda	 ﾠand	 ﾠRodrik	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠ
O’Rourke	 ﾠand	 ﾠSinnott	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Attitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠEMU	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠother	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
preferences,	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠand	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample.	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
inflation-ﾭ‐fighting	 ﾠmandate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠECB,	 ﾠone	 ﾠmight	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠless	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
EMU	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠamong	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠlike	 ﾠlow	 ﾠ
inflation,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠpensioners.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠindicate:	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1	 ﾠgives	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠmultivariate	 ﾠprobit	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Eurozone	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠglobalization,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠand	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Monetary	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠmay	 ﾠall	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
correlated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother.4	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEMU	 ﾠis	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠ
correlated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠglobalization	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠeducated,	 ﾠwhite	 ﾠcollar	 ﾠworkers,	 ﾠand	 ﾠretirees.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
hand,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlower	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployed,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠpolitically.5	 ﾠInterestingly,	 ﾠpensioners	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSpring	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠEurobarometer	 ﾠSurvey.	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠare	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠStata	 ﾠusing	 ﾠmvprobit;	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠare	 ﾠclustered	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠCountry	 ﾠdummies	 ﾠare	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregression,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficients	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreported	 ﾠ
here.	 ﾠRespondents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcategorised	 ﾠas	 ﾠeither	 ﾠmanual	 ﾠworkers,	 ﾠwhite	 ﾠcollar	 ﾠworkers,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
likely	 ﾠto	 ﾠfavour	 ﾠEMU	 ﾠin	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠare	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
France.6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠAttitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠglobalization,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠEMU	 ﾠ(multivariate	 ﾠ
probit	 ﾠanalysis)	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠauthor’s	 ﾠestimates,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(Eurobarometer)	 ﾠ
data.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Third,	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠ(Figure	 ﾠ3).	 ﾠRespondents	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠreport	 ﾠthat	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
membership	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample.	 ﾠIreland	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong	 ﾠtime	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmost	 ﾠEurophile	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠa	 ﾠhappy	 ﾠcoincidence,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠConstitution	 ﾠobliges	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠreferenda	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
unemployed,	 ﾠretirees,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthose	 ﾠstill	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
regressions.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠ	 ﾠRegressions	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠon	 ﾠrequest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠtreaties),	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠoverwhelmingly	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠview	 ﾠEU	 ﾠ
membership	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠlight	 ﾠ(Sinnott	 ﾠand	 ﾠMcBride	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠNet	 ﾠsentiment	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
comfortably	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠelsewhere	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ(if	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless	 ﾠso),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠstill	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdeterioration	 ﾠeverywhere.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠdramatic	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
deterioration	 ﾠin	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
(albeit	 ﾠless	 ﾠso)	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsharp	 ﾠand	 ﾠrather	 ﾠ
general.	 ﾠNet	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠFrance	 ﾠand	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠunusual,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠzero	 ﾠin	 ﾠIreland,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠunusual.	 ﾠImportantly,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠonly	 ﾠgo	 ﾠas	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠSpring	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbailout	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠin	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdo	 ﾠto	 ﾠIrish	 ﾠ
attitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠunanswered	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠ
large	 ﾠramifications.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠa	 ﾠsharp	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠin	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠclass-ﾭ‐based	 ﾠor	 ﾠnational	 ﾠhostility	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
EMU,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotent	 ﾠone.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ EMU	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠtrilemma,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠshared	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠand	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠEurozone	 ﾠmembers.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
moves	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠextremely	 ﾠdifficult:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
combination	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstate	 ﾠare	 ﾠwinning	 ﾠout	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠimplying	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠstuck	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠunion	 ﾠwith	 ﾠserious	 ﾠdesign	 ﾠflaws.	 ﾠGerman	 ﾠ
voters	 ﾠ(among	 ﾠothers)	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠwant	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘transfer	 ﾠunion,’	 ﾠand	 ﾠIrish	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠ(among	 ﾠ
others)	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠwant	 ﾠtax	 ﾠharmonisation.	 ﾠPowerful	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠare	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠagree	 ﾠon	 ﾠshared	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠalone	 ﾠshared	 ﾠbank	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠ
frameworks.	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠEMU	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsurvive	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠrun	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠremains	 ﾠstuck	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠtrilemmas	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠopen	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠas	 ﾠRodrik	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
puts	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ“When	 ﾠglobalization	 ﾠcollides	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠpolitics,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmart	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠbets	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠpolitics.”	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠno-ﾭ‐one	 ﾠshould	 ﾠunderestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠsunk	 ﾠinto	 ﾠEMU,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdamage	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ





































Figure	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠAttitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ























Figure	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ(cont.).	 ﾠAttitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEU	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠ(Eurobarometer)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis:	 ﾠstuck	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtrilemmas	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠmany	 ﾠways	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008-ﾭ‐9	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠgolden	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠitself	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
strong	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠEurope-ﾭ‐wide	 ﾠinitiatives	 ﾠto	 ﾠregulate	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
bankers.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠbroadly,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠold	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠimbalances,	 ﾠ
debt,	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdifficulty,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠstrategies	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠ–	 ﾠinter	 ﾠalia	 ﾠin	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
transportation	 ﾠinfrastructures,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠforward	 ﾠanyway	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
seemed	 ﾠobvious.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠwould,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcontext,	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
largely	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐border	 ﾠin	 ﾠnature.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ What	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠineffectual	 ﾠmoves	 ﾠon	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
regulation,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠunwillingness	 ﾠto	 ﾠconfront	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠ
crisis	 ﾠhead-ﾭ‐on.	 ﾠRather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠpromoting	 ﾠpan-ﾭ‐European	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠstrategies,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠenthusiastically	 ﾠpromoting	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐cyclical	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠ
adjustments	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiphery,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠinsist	 ﾠthat	 ﾠheavily	 ﾠindebted	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠrepay	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠcreditors	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠin	 ﾠfull.	 ﾠNot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
policy	 ﾠincoherent,	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
preaching	 ﾠausterity	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinsistence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtaxpayers	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
investors	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbank	 ﾠlosses	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstage	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
damaging	 ﾠconfrontation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠcore	 ﾠand	 ﾠperiphery	 ﾠtaxpayers.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠare	 ﾠunknowable,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠIreland,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
troika’s	 ﾠintervention,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠparty	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠannihilated	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolls,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠradical	 ﾠand	 ﾠEurosceptic	 ﾠSinn	 ﾠFéin	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
sniffing	 ﾠat	 ﾠits	 ﾠheels:	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠconservative,	 ﾠand	 ﾠEurophile,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠin	 ﾠEurope.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠthree	 ﾠor	 ﾠfour	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠmix	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdo	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
anybody’s	 ﾠguess.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ At	 ﾠone	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdamning	 ﾠindictment	 ﾠof	 ﾠEurope’s	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠleadership.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠanother	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠproof	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitics,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
politics	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠdominant,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠ
response	 ﾠimpossible.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnation	 ﾠstate	 ﾠremains	 ﾠdominant	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEurozone,	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrilemma	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠlogical	 ﾠpossibilities.	 ﾠEither	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
opinion	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuccessfully	 ﾠignored	 ﾠin	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠlike	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠGreece	 ﾠand	 ﾠIreland;	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
European	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcome	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠrun.	 ﾠSomething	 ﾠ
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